Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Disclosure of an interesting Botnet - The Server (Part 2)

So let's try to shed light onto the C&C server.

At first I want again to thank Chae Jong Bin! With his brief network analysis of this botnet, he gave me a solid background.

The first thing you realize when visiting http://xlamzju-lrychj.info is directory listing was activated. This gives us the chance to explore files and folders.
There are a lot of PHP Scripts, 3 .dat files and 3 subfolders.

Figure 1: Directory Listing of ".com/.info" unit
Share:

Monday, September 10, 2012

Disclosure of an interesting Botnet - The Executable (Part 1)

While searching for another interesting malware sample I came across a brief description from Chae Jong Bin of an yet unknown botnet. So thanks to him!
I took a quick look into the executable and decided to do further analysis, because the Bot is implemented as a Windows Service and I haven't analyzed such an executable before.

The first part of this analysis is about the "Static and Dynamnic Analysis" of the executable. Tools used are HxD Hexeditor, MiTeC EXE Explorer, OllyDbg, IDA Pro, Process Explorer and Wireshark. The second part deals with the C&C server(s) and its contents.
What's remarkable is the Bots very small size of just 12 KByte. A few months ago the CSIS Security Group A/S discovered the "World’s smallest trojan-banker" and it had size of 20 KByte, so... :-)

Sample: telnet.exe
Size: 12.288 Bytes
MD5: 44AD16455EFC3051FD00FE73E3BB7E40

Share:

Monday, August 20, 2012

The case of the gethostbyname() exception

While analyzing a malicious bot in OllyDbg (1.10) on my Windows XP SP3 Virtual Machine, I came across an odd exception (0x000006B0) which always occured trying to step over the Windows API function "gethostbyname()". Every time OllyDbg ended up in kernel32.dll after calling RtlRaiseException() (ntdll.dll). Because a search on Google doesn't gave me any answers I decided to find the cause on my own and hopefully solve the problem.

Figure 1: gethostbyname() exception
Share:

Saturday, August 11, 2012

Dropper of kernel-mode stealer

While searching for some interesting, unknown malware samples I came across a report that took my attention (http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=9c0744b8119df63371b83724bafe2095).
The malware has an user-mode and a kernel-mode component and looks like a legit program at first (.sys + .inf files). By typing one of the created registry entries (NdisrdMP.ndi) into the search mask I discovered several reports of earlier (and also widely detected) versions of this family. By looking at the dates, the first uploaded sample is from year 2009, so this malware family is at least used since then.
Unfortunately I hadn‘t access to the Threatexpert database, so I contacted rkhunter from kernelmode.info if he could provide me a copy. So thanks goes to him!

This paper is about Static Analysis of the Dropper of this malware. You can find the rest of the analysis (Kernel-mode Payload + Additional Components) on rkhunters‘ Blog at http://artemonsecurity.blogspot.com/2012/07/investigation-interesting-kernel-mode.html.

Whitepaper download: http://artemonsecurity.com/research_of_unk_malware.pdf
Share: